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Social psychologists have spent many long hours contemplating the terrain where 
motivation intersects with thinking.  Specifically, the field of social cognition has developed a 
rich literature describing how we perceive our social worlds and the ways in which we might be 
motivated to think about those social worlds (Fiske, 1995).  In particular, these scholars have 
documented numerous flaws resulting from the goals that motivate our social thinking.  These 
errors and biases seem likely to pose serious problems in educational and achievement contexts.  
In spite of the extensive literature in this area, social cognition scholars have rarely focused on 
these settings.  Thus, great potential exists for applying social psychological research on the 
goals behind our social cognitions to educational contexts.   
  In this chapter, we review research on social cognition and suggest ways that it might 
illuminate our understanding of and enhance our social interactions in achievement settings.  We 
focus particularly on flaws in our social cognitions and, borrowing Ross’ (1981) conception of 
the lay person as an intuitive scientist, what the implications of these flaws are for us as social 
perceivers.  We then propose that there are three basic goals that influence our social cognitions.  
After discussing each, we examine the implications this conceptualization of social cognition in 
achievement settings.  Primarily, we address educational settings, focusing on students and 
teachers.  However, we suspect that parallel implications may exist for other achievement 
contexts such as work or athletics. 
The goals underlying our social cognitions 
Fiske (1995) defines social cognition as, “the process by which people think about and 
make sense of people” (p. 151).  As perceivers, we typically make sense of others quickly.  Yet, 
as targets of others’ social perceptions, we feel that our thoughts, feelings, motivations, and 
behaviors are immensely complex for others to accurately understand.  Although we are often 
surprisingly accurate in our first impressions about complex others (Ambady & Rosenthal, 
1993), we also make mistakes frequently.  An illustrious research tradition within social 
cognition has brought to light many of the errors we make in our efforts to understand the social 
world around us.  Although few of these mistakes are conscious, a great many of them are 
motivated in the sense that these cognitions help people pursue different goals.  For example, 
some students may believe that their teacher calls on them only when they do not know the 
answer.  Naturally, they perceive this to be unfair and often develop increasing antipathy towards 
their teacher.  In other words, these students observe their teachers’ actions and develop a social Motivated Thinkers        3 
 
 
cognition (i.e., an interpretation) based on these observations.  Even when there is ample 
evidence to the contrary, these students may be motivated to maintain this cognition for a variety 
of reasons.  They may be positively reinforced by friends when they complain about their unfair 
teacher; they may find that this belief helps them to explain away poor grades in the class; or 
they may maintain this belief in the service of convincing their parents that a particular subject is 
really not for them. 
As alluded to previously, an important characteristic of the goals behind social cognitions 
is that they are not always conscious.  If these same students were asked about their teacher 
picking on them unfairly, they would explain with great conviction the incontestable veracity of 
their belief.  (With the benefits of selective recall, they may even provide compelling evidence to 
defend their assertion.)  They may also articulate their fondness for interacting with friends, that 
they are not doing as well in this class, or that they wish that their parents were less concerned 
with their performance in this particular subject.  However, it seems unlikely that they would 
consciously connect their belief about being picked on with these goals underlying that 
cognition.  On the other hand, some instances of motivated thinking are clearly conscious.  
Athletes are motivated to regularly and consciously convince themselves of their superiority over 
their opponents.  
We should also note that many social cognitions are not motivated at all.  Frequently, we 
infer the mental states of others without being intentional or goal directed.  Without trying, we 
might spontaneously infer that somebody is happy or amused by observing the smile on their 
face.  These observations and inferences tend to be relatively automatic in the sense that they 
happen quickly, require negligible effort, and probably are not retained in memory for any length 
of time.  In this way, they may resemble the precognitive affective judgments described by 
Zajonc (1980). 
  As a final note, the goals that underlie our social cognitions, should be distinguished from 
habits of mind, propensities, or thinking dispositions (Perkins, Tishman, Ritchhart, Donis, & 
Andrade, 2000).  According to Perkins et al. (2000), thinking dispositions concern how people 
are disposed to enact whatever thought-related abilities that they have.  Thus, a tendency to be 
close-minded, curious, or reflective would constitute a thinking disposition.  Kruglanski and his 
colleagues’ work on “need for closure” (e.g., Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & 
Schaper, 1996) provides another example.  These dispositions are comprised of some minimum Motivated Thinkers        4 
 
 
element of ability, the inclination to enact that ability, and the sensitivity to notice situations 
where that ability might be enacted (Perkins et al., 2000).  Although these dispositions are likely 
to play a role in the goals that underlie our social cognitions, they are more akin to personality 
traits.  In other words, thinking dispositions might explain general trends in one’s thinking (and 
behavior) across many situations over time. The present chapter instead develops a framework to 
help understand the goals that direct our social cognitions in individual situations.  We 
hypothesize these goals to be so fundamental that in any given situation at least one of them will 
aptly characterize our social cognitions, regardless of our general thinking dispositions. 
With these clarifications in mind, we hypothesize that three basic goals underlie people’s 
social cognitions.  (1) Accurate understanding: People are motivated to think in ways that will 
facilitate their understanding of themselves and others in their social world.  This primary 
motive can be challenged, interrupted, or superseded by two additional goals.  (2) Enhancing 
one’s sense of self: People are motivated to think in ways that enhance or maintain their sense of 
self.  In other words, people are likely to preferentially recall, retain, and believe cognitions that 
(directly or indirectly) flatter the self or help to maintain a positive self-image.  (3) Efficiency: 
People are motivated to think efficiently.  On the one hand, we are motivated to economically 
process the vast amounts of information in our social environments, but we are also “cognitive 
misers” who frequently strive to avoid hard thinking (Fiske, 1995). 
In sum, our overarching goal is to accurately understand others, but this goal may be 
undermined by competing goals to maintain our sense of self or to conserve mental effort.  To be 
sure, these are not mutually exclusive goals.  Many of our efficient mental shortcuts are intended 
to produce accurate understandings and, coincidentally, happen to be flattering to ourselves.  
These three goals can work in concert, independently, in opposition to one another.  To evaluate 
this idea that all social cognitions can be conceptualized as one of these three goals, we examine 
each goal in turn and highlight some of the mistakes associated with each. 
Goal #1:  Accurate understanding of ourselves and others 
In order to effectively navigate our social worlds, we need to better understand those who 
inhabit it (Heider, 1958b).  Thus, as a primary, fundamental goal – our default setting – we try to 
accurately understand others in our social environment (Kunda, 1990).  Accurately perceiving 
who is doing what and why is essential for guiding our behavior.  Ross (1981) has described 
people trying to make sense out of their social environments as “intuitive scientists.”  According Motivated Thinkers        5 
 
 
to Ross, we pursue several tasks in an effort to understand our social context: perceiving and 
encoding information about a given situation (often through observation); determining the extent 
to which our sample of data might generalize to other situations; looking for correlational or 
causal patterns in the data; and summarizing that information into a theory that we can test and 
revise.  From these lay theories, we can make predictions that allow us to negotiate our social 
worlds proactively and strategically.   
To illustrate this process, imagine a new student joining a class part-way through the 
year.  She will be motivated to understand what her new peers are like, how they interact with 
each other, and what their working styles are like.  As part of this data collection process, she 
may interact with some of her peers to learn their norms and typical response patterns.  If she 
asks classmates to borrow lunch money, presumably some will assent, and others will refuse her.  
With each request and interaction, she will have to decide how representative each successful 
loan or rejection is and perhaps weight it correspondingly.  As she collects these data, she can 
begin to draw conclusions about which norms are associated with or causally related to the 
different outcomes.  Perhaps she obtains lunch money more frequently when she intimidates her 
classmates, but she simultaneously loses friends.  Throughout this process she will construct 
tentative theories that allow her to predict how her behaviors will be received by others and how 
others will interact with her.  As these predictions are supported or disconfirmed, she may or 
may not choose to revise the underlying theories.   
Presumably the more accurate our theories and predictions are about the others in our 
social environment, the more effective our behaviors will be.  To maximize our effectiveness, we 
are fundamentally motivated to accurately understand those in our social surroundings.  
Although this goal is basic, there are no guarantees that we will achieve accuracy in our thoughts 
and inferences about those in our social environments (Kunda, 1990).  Quite often, we choose 
inept strategies, are subject to bias, and make mistakes.  In this section, we illustrate four 
potentially problematic tendencies in our thinking when we put on our “intuitive scientist” 
thinking caps and attempt to make sense out of others in our social worlds.  Although some of 
the research we summarize describes non-social cognitions, all of the fundamental biases and 
problems described do apply to social thinking. 
Understanding what we perceive Motivated Thinkers        6 
 
 
Although we are generally competent at perceiving and encoding data gathered from 
others and ourselves in social settings, we are imperfect.  One common bias that we have is 
described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) as the availability heuristic – a tendency to judge 
probabilities or likelihoods of events based upon their accessibility in our minds.  Specifically, 
those thoughts that are more available to us are viewed as more likely to occur.  In one 
illustration of this principle, Tversky and Kahneman showed that people mistakenly presume that 
more words in English begin with “k” or “r” than have “k” or “r” as their third letter (e.g., 
kite/take or red/car).  They attribute this erroneous assumption to people usually arriving at an 
answer by thinking of examples of both types of words.  However, people fail to account for how 
much easier it is to search through one’s vocabulary using first letters rather than third letters.  
The first letters of words are simply more available to us, so naturally we generate more 
examples of words beginning with “k” or “r”. 
  Although the illustration in this experiment is trivial, the implications for classrooms are 
not.  In most classrooms, teachers focus more of their attention on boys than girls in spite of 
thinking that they are allocating their attention evenly (Beaman, Wheldall, & Kemp, 2006).  
Because boys cause trouble in more visible ways, they are likely to be more available in 
teachers’ minds.  As a result, teachers who strive to accurately understand whether they are 
deploying their attention fairly may actually attend to boys disproportionately while thinking that 
they are being equitable.  In this way, teachers may err in their goal to accurately observe their 
social world.   
Understanding our sample 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identify a second heuristic that creates potential problems 
for us.  As we pursue our goal to accurately understand those in our social worlds, we try to 
understand what our sample of data is like.  Of particular importance, we try to determine 
whether the specific data that we have collected is idiosyncratic or generalizable.  When 
engaging in this task we often rely on the representativeness heuristic.  Tversky and Kahneman 
describe this judgmental guideline as an assessment, “in which probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B” (1974, 
p. 1124).  In other words, we often confuse representativeness with similarity. 
They illustrate this heuristic through several different studies.  In one, they show that 
people ignore baseline rates and prior probabilities because they are swayed by the Motivated Thinkers        7 
 
 
representativeness of a description.  For example, after reading a description of someone who fits 
multiple stereotypes of a librarian, people are then asked to determine the person’s profession.  
In deciding, people routinely ignore the fact that being a librarian is a relatively uncommon. 
In a school context, we can again see how serious problems might result from the 
representativeness heuristic in spite of our goal to accurately perceive others in our social 
environment.  Teachers who encounter immigrant students who struggle to articulate their 
thoughts in English might make negative inferences about the capabilities of these students.  In 
terms of their diction, these students may sound similar to less capable, native English-speaking 
peers.  However, this inference ignores the baseline rate that almost nobody sounds eloquent in a 
foreign language that they are still mastering.  Thus, these teachers have confused the foreign 
students’ sounding similar to their less capable classmates with the extent to which articulateness 
is representative of academic capacity. 
Understanding correlations and causes 
  In trying to accurately understand our social contexts, we are especially interested in 
discerning who or what is responsible for certain outcomes (Heider, 1958a).  As observers of 
these contexts, we are particularly sensitive to and observant of patterns of co-occurrence.  
However, while we are quite good at observing some patterns (e.g., those that are salient or 
available to us), we fail to identify others (e.g., those that run counter to our intuition).  
Furthermore, we even identify patterns of co-occurrences that do not exist.  This “illusory 
correlation” is our tendency to detect associations between events that are actually unrelated 
(Chapman, 1967). 
  In addition to this process of detecting covariation, we are particularly motivated to detect 
causal relationships.  Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) found evidence of a systematic error 
that we make when we try to assess why people behave as they do.  According to the 
“fundamental attribution error,” we tend to overemphasize the role that a person’s dispositions 
play in explaining their behavior while underestimating the relative influence of the situation.  
Ross and his colleagues illustrated this principle by staging a quiz show in which two 
participants were randomly selected to play the role of either the questioner or the answerer.  The 
questioner asked a series of “challenging, but not impossible” questions to the other contestant.  
Because they could select questions exclusively from areas of their unique expertise, the 
questioners enjoyed a huge advantage based on their role.  At the end of the questioning, the Motivated Thinkers        8 
 
 
contestants provided intelligence ratings for themselves and the other participant (compared to 
other students at their institution).  The answerers rated the questioners’ intelligence at the 67
th 
percentile.  Meanwhile, the questioners, who were in a position to realize their role-conferred 
advantage, rated themselves only at the 54
th percentile.  The authors interpreted these findings as 
evidence that we tend to overemphasize the impact of dispositional causes (e.g., the questioner 
was quite intelligent) relative to situational causes (e.g., the game made it much easier to be the 
questioner).   
  These errors in detecting patterns and assessing causality from those patterns can create 
serious problems in school settings.  For example, if students detect an illusory association that a 
certain group of their peers receives preferential treatment from their teacher, they may well 
make the dispositional attribution that their teacher is prejudiced.  This type of attribution can 
poison a classroom climate and impede learning. 
Understanding our theories 
  Perhaps our most critical task as intuitive scientists is to develop and revise theories that 
will allow us to predict events in our social environments so that we can adapt to them.  Our best 
theories simplify and increase the utility of the data that we have observed, generalize beyond the 
sample data, and illuminate correlational and causal relationships.  Most importantly, our 
theories should help us achieve the goal of accurately perceiving those in our social environment.  
For the most part, our theories probably do facilitate accurate social cognitions.  However, these 
theories are also subject to problematic biases. 
  One particularly problematic bias is that we selectively seek out evidence that confirms 
the theories that we develop (Wason, 1960).  In other words, we selectively attend to, encode, 
store, and retrieve information that is congruent with our notions of how people in our social 
environments function.  The inverse of this confirmation bias is similarly problematic – we tend 
to disregard or discredit evidence that might disconfirm our theories.   
  Rosenthal’s work on self-fulfilling prophecies in the classroom presents what might be 
viewed as an extreme example of confirmation bias (Rosenthal, 2002).  In the classic 
“Pygmalion” experiment (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968), teachers are led to believe that certain 
students are poised to make a big academic leap during the current year.  In other words, the 
experimenters provide them with a theory that the teachers can then seek to confirm (or 
disprove) through interacting with their students throughout the remainder of the year.  Results Motivated Thinkers        9 
 
 
of the original and many follow-up studies (e.g., Jussim & Eccles, 1992) indicate that teachers 
expectations do influence student performance.  According to Rosenthal (2002), these teachers 
create a warmer climate for these students, teach them more, give them greater opportunities to 
respond, and provide them with more differentiated feedback.  The result of teachers confirming 
the theories they have adopted in these experiments is that these students did indeed perform 
better than the students in the control group.  Whether teachers are developing and confirming 
theories about their students or vice-versa, the “Pygmalion” studies show the effects of 
confirmation bias in the classroom, even when teachers and students are motivated to accurately 
perceive one another.   
In sum, we posit that, as social perceivers we are fundamentally motivated to accurately 
perceive the situations in which we find ourselves.  However, this goal alone provides no 
guarantee that we will achieve accuracy in our perceptions.  As intuitive scientists, we collect 
data samples, assess the generalizability of those samples, find correlational and causal 
associations, and develop theories that help us navigate our social worlds.  However, unwitting, 
unmotivated mistakes in our thinking and biases in our processing can inhibit this fundamental 
goal of accuracy.  To make matters worse, there are often competing goals influencing our social 
cognitions. 
Goal #2:  Enhancing one’s sense of self 
One of the main goals that disrupts our efforts to accurately perceive our social world is 
the goal to maintain or bolster our sense of self (Dunning, 1999).  Social psychologists have 
examined a multitude of ways in which people go to great lengths to preserve their self-esteem 
and their self-concept.  As in the previous section, we will review a few illustrative examples 
rather than cataloguing the universe of strategies that people employ to maintain or enhance their 
sense of self.  Specifically, we will examine the ways in which we maintain self-serving biases, 
engage in naïve realism, and strive to maintain a consistent self-concept. 
Self-serving biases 
  We have developed a number of strategies to facilitate our goal to see ourselves in a 
flattering light.  Among the best known, are the ways that we value certain traits, and how we 
compare ourselves to others on those traits.  Dunning (1999) reviews several of these findings.  
In one strategy, when describing attributes of desirable personal qualities, we tend to emphasize 
attributes we think we possess.  For example, those who view themselves as ambitious and Motivated Thinkers        10 
 
 
independent might view those attributes as important to good leadership; meanwhile, those who 
view themselves as caring and people-oriented might view those traits as central to being a good 
leader.  As a second strategy, Dunning indicates that we tend to think of ourselves as above 
average on most positive attributes such as being sensible, idealistic, or disciplined.  Conversely, 
we view ourselves as below average on negative traits.  As a third technique, we rate people who 
we view as similar to ourselves more favorably than those who are dissimilar. 
  While this self-serving view of the world may play a role in mitigating stress, anxiety, 
and depression (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling, & Tibbs, 
1992), this goal to see oneself positively can also be problematic.  According to Kruger (1999), 
those who are the least proficient in certain domains are the most deluded in their self-
assessments.  On tests of humor, logic, and grammar, people scoring in the 12
th percentile on 
skills rated themselves at the 62
nd percentile on average.    Kruger explains that having low skills 
in a domain may signal diminished metacognitive capability in that domain.  This lack of 
metacognitive ability inhibits one’s effectiveness in self-assessing those skills. 
  Although we do not know the extent to which these findings generalize from the 
laboratory to the classroom, the implications are unsettling.  Those students with the worst study 
skills may think that their skills are well above average.  They may not know enough about what 
good studying looks like to accurately reflect on and assess their skill level.  Consequently, they 
probably do not perceive a need to improve those skills.  It’s also conceivable that the worst 
behaved students may think that their behavior is better than average, thus mitigating a need to 
improve their behavior.  At the more general level of our self-serving biases, it may be that 
students (or teachers for that matter) might be motivated to discount or dismiss constructive 
criticism that might threaten their self-esteem.  If true, this resistance to constructive criticism 
poses a barrier to learning and warrants substantial attention from researchers.  In classrooms, for 
example, students who perceive themselves as excellent writers may simply ignore their 
teacher’s suggestions for improving clarity, arguing that they have made stylistic innovations 
rather than mistakes. 
Naïve realism 
   A second domain of goals that enhance our sense of self includes those that guide our 
subjective impressions of the world.  Ross and Ward’s (1996) theory of naïve realism suggests 
that we perceive the world in ways that are crucial to maintaining our sense of self.  They pose Motivated Thinkers        11 
 
 
three tenets in this theory.  First, we believe that we see objective reality.  Second, other rational 
people will share our perception of this reality.  Third, if others do not share this perception, it is 
because they were exposed to different information, they are unwilling or unable to process the 
information normally, or they are biased.  In sum, we believe that our perceptions and opinions 
of the world are basically correct; consequently, those who disagree with us must be wrong.   
In support of this theory, Ross and Ward cite evidence such as the false consensus effect 
– a phenomenon in which people tend to believe that their opinion is normative.  In an empirical 
demonstration of this effect, Ross and his colleagues (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) offered 
Stanford undergraduates the chance to participate in a study by walking around campus in a 
sandwich board whose advertisement encouraged students to “Eat at Joe’s”.  Alternatively, 
students could turn down this offer and participate in a later study instead.  After deciding 
whether to participate or not, students then estimated the percentage of other subjects who would 
agree to participate.  Students who had just agreed to participate assumed that most of their peers 
would also agree to participate.  Those who had just refused presumed that the majority of 
students would also refuse.  In addition to assuming that our opinion is the majority opinion, 
Ross and Ward review evidence indicating that we perceive ourselves to be moderate and 
nuanced in our point of view, and we perceive those with opposing opinions as having extreme 
perspectives (e.g., Arabs and Israelis or Democrats and Republicans perceiving one another).  
Thus, we believe that we see objective reality, assume ourselves to be in the majority opinion in 
this view of objective reality, and tend to exaggerate our differences with the other side.   
This belief that we perceive objective reality (and the other side does not) has potent 
implications.  To get a sense of how potent, simply imagine what life would be like if we were 
not motivated to maintain this belief.  It would be hard for us to get out of bed in the morning if 
we constantly doubted whether our interactions with others were really as they seemed to be.   
Because this belief that we see objective reality is so important, when it is threatened, we 
defend it fiercely.  When seen through this lens of naïve realism, it suddenly becomes much 
easier to see why seemingly petty classroom conflicts between students tend toward escalation 
rather than resolution.  It also makes more sense that emotional meltdowns often result when a 
teacher sides with one student over another in refereeing such conflicts.  At the core of many of 
these disagreements is a battle over whether the reality that a student (or teacher) perceives is 
affirmed or discredited.  Thus, rather than daily conflicts of opinion that arise in schools turning Motivated Thinkers        12 
 
 
into valuable learning opportunities, they often escalate and derail the learning process.  For 
instance, imagine that a U.S. Government teacher, who is a Democrat, decides to present a lesson 
on the upcoming presidential election.  During the lesson a student angrily objects to the 
presentation stating that she is a Republican and the teacher is clearly favoring the Democratic 
candidate.  Both teacher and student believe that they are viewing the situation objectively.  They 
will likely conclude that the other party must be an extremist to see it any differently.  An 
argument may ensue, and the focus of the lesson will likely be lost. 
Cognitive dissonance 
  A third way in which we are motivated to enhance the self is our goal to reduce feelings 
of cognitive dissonance.  In other words, we are motivated to present and maintain an image that 
we are a cohesive, consistent self.  In the original research on this topic, subjects performed a 
boring task and then were asked to lie to the next participant in the waiting room about how 
enjoyable the task was (Festinger, 1962).  When participants were asked later for their true 
opinion of the task, those who were paid $20 justified their lie much more easily than those who 
were paid only $1.  Results indicated that the underpaid subjects rationalized these discrepant 
thoughts of performing an aversive task and misrepresenting their experience by convincing 
themselves that they really did like the task.  Evidently, this rationalization was easier than 
entertaining the notion that they were an inconsistent person who lied to others for the sake of 
making them perform the same unpleasant task they had just endured. 
Numerous replications and follow-up studies of cognitive dissonance have followed.  
Cialdini (2001) notes a number of the seemingly absurd lengths people will go to in order to 
maintain consistency and not threaten their sense of self.  People have agreed to post ugly 
billboards in their yards, endured harsh hazing rituals, and awaited UFOs for hours – all an effort 
to maintain cognitive consistency.  From these additional studies, several important caveats have 
been noted in the theory of cognitive dissonance.  Specifically, if we are to experience cognitive 
dissonance, we must feel that we have freely chosen to engage in the behavior in question and 
that behavior must have foreseeable negative consequences (Cooper & Fazio, 1984).  Of 
particular importance in the present context is Kunda’s conclusion that, “These conditions 
suggest that dissonance arousal requires a threat to the self: The cognition that one has 
knowingly chosen to engage in a bad or foolish behavior is inconsistent with a self image as a 
decent and intelligent person” (1990, p. 484).   Motivated Thinkers        13 
 
 
  We suspect that, as students approach adolescence and tend to become more concerned 
with developing a stable identity (Erikson, 1968; Waterman, 1982), their goal to maintain 
cognitive consistency may become increasingly important.   Specifically, students’ efforts to 
project a coherent identity to their peers may increase.  To the extent that they freely engage in 
behaviors that are congruent or incongruent with a self-image of “a good student” they are 
probably paving the way for similar behaviors in the future.  In other words, the behaviors that 
students engage in at school will likely build momentum for similar behaviors in the future 
simply because engaging in other types of behaviors might threaten students’ sense of self by 
potentially appearing inconsistent. 
 
Goal #3:  Efficiency 
  The second group of goals that disrupts our striving to accurately perceive our social 
world is that we strive towards cognitive efficiency.  Stated less favorably, we are “cognitive 
misers” who dislike putting forth more effort into our thinking than necessary (Fiske, 1995).  
Within person perception, two of the more commonly used cognitive labor saving strategies are 
categorizing/stereotyping others and anchoring and adjusting.  This section describes these two 
basic strategies that we employ to make sense of other people.   
Categorizing, stereotyping, in-groups, and out-groups 
  One of the most essential cognitive processes that we engage in is to group perceived 
stimuli into categories (Allport, 1979/1954).  For the most part, this grouping process effectively 
simplifies the complex world around us.  Although we may not wish to encounter either, having 
clearly defined categories for “liars” and “lions” allows us to quickly assess the threat we are 
facing.  We can then choose which actions will be most appropriate in responding to the 
situation.  In the case of avoiding lions, the speedier cognitive processing facilitated by 
categorical thinking will be especially adaptive!  Although these categorization processes are 
normal and adaptive, when we employ them to simplify the complex world of those who we 
interact with, we can get ourselves into trouble.   
  Stereotypes refer to the beliefs we have about the attributes of other groups of people.  
They tend to be over-generalized, inaccurate, and resistant to change (Katz & Braly, 1933).  
When we encounter new individuals in our social environment, we are inclined to automatically 
process them according to at least a few categories (e.g., that the person is male or female, tall or Motivated Thinkers        14 
 
 
short, etc.).  As soon as we assign some of our general knowledge about that category to the 
individual in question, we have engaged in stereotyping.  For example, upon meeting a female 
who is 5’11”, we might think that she is tall (i.e., does not conform to our stereotype of the 
average female).  On the other hand, if we also learn that she is a basketball player, we may find 
her height unremarkable because “tall” is congruent with our stereotype of basketball players.   
  Up to this point, the categorization and stereotyping processes are not particularly 
problematic.  The difficulties emerge because we have a strong tendency to categorize people as 
being part of our in-group or as being members of an out-group (Devine, 1995).  Our in-group 
could be based on any of the group memberships we hold: sex, race, political party, alma-mater, 
etc.  Once we have made these divisions, we then begin to stereotype.  We view our various in-
groups as diverse but see the corresponding out-groups as relatively homogeneous.  Most 
important, as Devine indicates, we then favor members of our in-group over the corresponding 
out-group (also see Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). 
These categorizations into in-groups and out-groups and the ensuing stereotyping can 
emerge from incredibly trivial distinctions.  In an illustrative example, Galinsky and Moskowitz 
(2000) placed subjects into groups of under-estimators or over-estimators after they had tried to 
guess the number of dots on a computer screen.  Even though subjects’ placement into one group 
or the other was a product of random assignment, these subjects still favored their own group 
over the out-group in spite of the trivial (and fallacious) distinction that was used to divide the 
subjects into groups. 
In a less artificial illustration, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues demonstrated how 
severe discrimination and prejudice can emerge out of these perceptions of group differences 
(Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).  In the Robbers Cave Experiment, boys at a 
summer camp who were assigned to one of two cabins began favoring their cabin-mates over the 
opposite group.  Despite the groups being essentially the same because they were randomly 
assigned, open hostilities and fights began to erupt as soon as the experimenters introduced 
competitive activities.  Even though the differences were purely perceptual, discrimination and 
prejudice between the groups were quick to foment. 
In schools, much of the impact of categorization and stereotyping as it leads to prejudice 
and discrimination is obvious.  Students who perceive themselves to be on the receiving end of 
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probably perform less well academically, and may be more likely to drop-out (Fine, 1991).  
However, many of the outcomes of this pervasive approach to conserving cognitive effort are 
more subtle.  For example, most of the people and cultures studied in social studies classes are 
presented as out-groups so that students are likely to instinctively view them as relatively 
homogeneous and develop overly simplified views of their societies.  In their efforts to cover 
vast amounts of material in ways that do not offend anybody (Loewen, 1995), social studies 
textbooks may reinforce this goal to think efficiently, simply, and stereotypically about others.  
Thus, the strategy of stereotyping can lead not only to strained relations between groups within 
schools, but also to diminished understanding for certain subject-matters. 
Anchoring and adjusting 
  In addition to categorization and stereotyping, we also employ a technique known as 
anchoring and adjusting as we pursue our goal to efficiently make sense of others in our social 
world.  Stereotyping may often be a reasonable approach when trying to make sense of members 
of an out-group who we know little about.  However, when trying to make sense of other 
members of our in-group, we should be able to improve upon that strategy without sacrificing 
efficiency.  Epley and his colleagues (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004) have found 
that people often make sense of others by using their own experience as an anchor and then 
making adjustments based on whatever additional knowledge they have.  In other words, we 
often attempt to figure out other people by “putting ourselves in their shoes” and then factoring 
additional information into the equation as long as it is readily available.  According to Epley et 
al. (2004), a big problem with this strategy is that our adjustments are rarely sufficient.  In other 
words, our final assessments tend to be egocentric because, after putting ourselves in their shoes, 
we fail to fully account for the ways in which we differ from others. 
  Daniel Ames’ (2004) has examined both of these strategies that we employ to save 
mental effort.  He finds that we tend to use stereotyping strategies more frequently when we 
perceive others as being relatively different.  However, when we perceive somebody as similar, 
we tend to engage in this anchoring and adjusting process (which Ames refers to as projection).   
  Although stereotyping probably leads to more serious problems in school settings (as 
described in the previous section), our tendency to make insufficient adjustments when we 
anchor and adjust also creates problems in educational contexts.  As experts in their subject 
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teachers are intimately familiar with a concept and have understood it at a sophisticated level for 
years, they may struggle to take the perspective of students who have no such understanding of 
the concept.  All too often teachers may attempt to relate to this experience by remembering back 
when they were trying to learn the same concept (i.e., anchoring with their own experience).  
Then they may try to make adjustments for different students.  However, they are unlikely to 
sufficiently account for how they differ from their students in important factors such as prior 
preparation for a topic or interest in that topic.   
  Categorizing and stereotyping as well as anchoring and adjusting help us decipher our 
social environments efficiently.  If we had to individually process every person that we 
encounter, we would quickly become overwhelmed.  However, to the extent that we rely heavily 
on these and other labor saving strategies, we are likely to reduce the accuracy of our social 
perceptions and undermine our goal of accurately understanding our social world. 
Summary & potential exceptions 
  We have posited that three basic goals underlie our social cognitions.  Most 
fundamentally, we are motivated to accurately perceive ourselves and others in our social 
environment.  In striving towards this end, we often act as lay scientists trying to understand the 
sample of data that we perceive, determine how representative that sample is, identify 
correlational or causal patterns in that data, and generate theories to guide our social behavior.  
Although we are motivated to accurately understand our social environments we do fall victim to 
a range of mistakes.  Overusing the availability and representativeness heuristics, committing the 
fundamental attribution error, and succumbing to confirmation bias are but a few of the problems 
that we encounter in pursuit of this basic goal.  In addition, two other goals often challenge, 
interrupt, or supersede this goal.  First, we strive to enhance (or at least maintain) our sense of 
self.  This goal is manifested through such problems as self-serving biases, naïve realism, and 
rationalizing cognitive dissonance.  Second, we are motivated to conserve cognitive effort.  As 
“cognitive misers” (Fiske, 1995), we engage in categorization and stereotyping as well as 
anchoring and adjusting.  Although often highly functional, these strategies also cause errors in 
our assessments of others. 
  The notion that these three goals can describe all of our motivated social cognitions is 
potentially easy to discredit.  Any motivated social cognition that cannot be described by one of 
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clinically depressed people frequently arrive at dinner parties preoccupied with the thought that 
nobody will want to speak with them.  Due to their depression, they may be unmotivated to 
accurately understand whether there is any truth to this thought.  To the contrary, they might be 
quite invested in believing that nobody wants to talk to them regardless of the reality of the 
situation.  They may appear to have no desire to enhance the self as they continually make self-
deprecating remarks.  In addition, they may not manifest any indications of efficient thinking; 
they might be willing to ruminate extensively on all the reasons why nobody likes them.  
Interpreted this way, this example could indeed represent an exception.  However, these 
individuals have probably formed cohesive identities around their perception that they are 
disliked, not worthwhile people.  Thus, their cognitions that nobody wants to talk with them do 
serve to maintain their sense of self, even if it is a negative sense of self. 
  A second set of exceptions might occur when individuals are motivated to think about a 
particular group towards whom they might be favorably biased.  For example, athletes may be 
motivated to think positively about the abilities of their team prior to a competition.  Although 
there is a technical sense in which these thoughts are not directly self enhancing, they probably 
serve to enhance the self indirectly.  As members of the team, part of the athletes’ identities and 
self-concepts are intertwined with the fate of the team.  When team members are motivated to 
think positively on behalf of the team, they enhance their self-concept to the extent that they 
have a strong team affiliation.  Even in an instance where they might be motivated to think 
negatively about their recent performance, these thoughts are probably motivated by a desire to 
bolster greater effort during the next practice or performance (thus indirectly enhancing the self 
via the improved team effort).   
In similar vein, Asian cultures tend to be more collectivist than individualistic (Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).  Members of these cultures may be less motivated to think in 
ways that enhance their sense of self.  This research raises an important issue – the rates at which 
people pursue the three goals proposed here almost certainly vary across cultures.  However, it 
still seems plausible that even if they are enhancing their sense of self less often than members of 
more individualistic cultures, they may still be doing so in the same indirect way that team 
members might be motivated to think in ways that enhance the team.  Recent work that utilizes 
implicit measures of self-esteem provides some support for this conjecture that East Asians are 
still motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Motivated Thinkers        18 
 
 
  As with any tentative explanation, we hope and encourage readers to contemplate other 
possible exceptions to have a better sense of how aptly these three tenets describe our social 
cognitions. 
Why does this formulation matter for education? 
  Arguably a more important issue than potential exceptions to our conceptualization of 
social cognition is whether or not any practical good comes of it – what we might call the Kurt 
Lewin test
1.  Thus, this section assesses how well our formulation might facilitate our 
understanding of real world behaviors.  Throughout this chapter we have illustrated how 
different mistakes that we make in social cognition might impact educational situations.  This 
section implements our conception more holistically and illustrates how it might enhance our 
understanding of achievement scenarios in school settings.  The first illustration explores how 
the goals behind our social cognitions can directly impact academic achievement; the second 
provides an example of indirect impact through teacher-student relationships. 
 
Direct impact 
  To see the potential direct impact that the goals behind our social cognitions might have 
on achievement, let us turn to a typical classroom scene.  During a lecture, the teacher explains a 
concept to the class, students listen and take notes, the teacher asks a series of questions to gauge 
the class’s level understanding, students respond, and then the teacher decides whether to move 
forward or further explain the material.  In these situations, teachers typically need to assess what 
their students are thinking, to what extent they understand the concepts in question, and what 
misconceptions need to be corrected before new material is introduced.  In short, they are 
motivated to accurately understand the thoughts and comprehension level of their students.  
However, this is not the only goal involved in these classroom situations.   
Because of the situational demands, teachers are also highly motivated to think 
efficiently.  Taking the time to check in with each student individually as to their level of 
understanding would prove fatal to the overall engagement of the class.  In many schools, the 
specter of standardized tests provides teachers with a strong extrinsic incentive to prioritize 
breadth over depth.  Thus, teachers need to quickly sample the level of understanding of their 
class, hope that the sample is representative of the overall level of understanding, and make 
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quick inferences about the patterns of (mis)understanding.  As discussed previously, these steps 
that teachers take as intuitive scientists are fraught with mistakes.  In spite of the likely flaws, 
teachers will probably develop a theory about the class’s level of understanding.  At the crudest 
level, the theory might approximate the logic that if a certain student understands, most of the 
class must understand.  A more sophisticated theory might explain why a certain level of 
understanding was or was not achieved by the class as a whole or by individual students.   
Once this lay theory is in place, a second set of goals will likely come into play – teachers 
will be motivated to find evidence that confirms their theory.  To entertain evidence to the 
contrary might threaten their self-concept as an effective teacher.  In other words, entertaining 
evidence to the contrary might entail acknowledging that, as a teacher, they do not have a good 
read on their class’ level of understanding.  As they continue to selectively attend to evidence 
that confirms their theory and ignore contradictory evidence, changing their minds will generate 
increasing dissonance.  Thus, teachers’ goal to maintain a positive sense of self can directly 
impede their ability to assess understanding and adapt teaching approaches to better serve their 
students.  We suspect that the most common manifestation of this pattern is one in which 
teachers explain material and conclude that students understand the material.  To conclude 
otherwise might imply that their explanation was deficient in some way.  In sum, teachers’ goal 
to accurately perceive their students’ level of understanding can be derailed by their goal to 
assess their class’ level of understanding efficiently and by their goal to maintain their sense of 
themselves as good teachers. 
  Our formulation might also explain achievement-related student behavior throughout this 
same scenario.  As teachers explain new concepts in their class, a primary student goal might be 
attempting to accurately assess what their teachers think they should know.  In other words, 
students need to parse apart important information (i.e., signal) from that which is superfluous 
(i.e., noise).  As they begin their intuitive scientist processes of collecting clues and developing 
theories, they will assess as efficiently as possible which information their teacher values.  They 
have no choice but to make these assessments efficient; as they assess, students must 
simultaneously understand the actual concepts which are being conveyed.  Once a theory – 
perhaps that what the teacher writes on the board is the valued information – is in place, they too 
will likely look to confirm their theory.  We suspect that just about every teacher has been on the 
receiving end of students seeking to test their theory with a version of the “Will this be on the Motivated Thinkers        20 
 
 
test?” question.  Once students have a lay theory about which information their teacher values, 
they will be motivated to selectively interpret new evidence as supporting their theory.  Often 
students are later confronted with problematic evidence in the form of a poor test performance.  
In this case, they could acknowledge that their theory of what their teacher values is flawed.  
However, this admission is tantamount to admitting that they lack sav.  It may well be easier to 
decide that the test was unfair, the teacher is biased, or some other rationalization that would 
preserve the students’ sense of self. 
  Other illustrations abound as to how these goals interact to explain the impact of 
classroom-based social interchanges on achievement.  Students’ refusal to see flaws in a paper 
may represent their goal to maintain a positive sense of self overriding their goal to accurately 
understand their teacher’s feedback.  Teachers determining which information to include in a 
lesson plan may illustrate competition between two goals: accurately assessing what students 
need to know in today’s world versus efficiently deciding on content by anchoring with what 
they were taught at that age and adjusting from there.  However, we suspect that the indirect 
impact of these goals might be even more important in their role in explaining student 
achievement. 
Indirect impact 
Numerous social aspects of the classroom may indirectly impact student achievement.  In 
this section, we focus on teacher-student relationships as a particularly important example.  This 
indirect influence on student achievement can be impeded or bolstered by the three goals we 
have proposed.  In particular, we highlight the potential biases and errors in social cognition that 
can affect these relationships. 
Educational settings are inherently social worlds.  In order to teach or to learn, students 
and teachers must have dozens of daily interactions that ultimately lead to the development of 
relationships.  Positive teacher-student relationships play an important role in the development of 
school competencies, such as attention, motivation, problem-solving, and self-esteem (Birch & 
Ladd, 1997; Pianta & Walsh, 1996).  Furthermore, relationships with adults impact children’s 
emotional development, self-regulation (Denham & Burton, 1996) and peer relations (Elicker, 
Englund, & Sroufe, 1992; Howes, Matheson, & Hamilton, 1994). The quality of teacher-student 
relationships are also associated with students’ grade point averages (DiLalla, Marcus, & 
Wright-Phillips, 2004).  These relationships can have lasting impacts on academic achievement.  Motivated Thinkers        21 
 
 
Hamre and Pianta (2001) found that negativity in teacher-child relationships in kindergarten 
uniquely predicted students’ grades, standardized test scores, and work habits through lower 
elementary school, even after controlling for characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and 
cognitive ability.   
Upon reflecting on one’s personal experiences in school, it may be easy to understand 
why teacher-child relationships affect academic achievement so much.  Many adults may 
remember how a close bond with a favorite teacher acted as powerful motivator to try harder in 
that class.  Many more adults probably recall their least favorite teacher, who may have been an 
even more powerful de-motivator.  Beyond motivation, teacher-student relationship quality may 
reflect the extent to which students engage the available instructional resources in the classroom 
(Entwisle & Hayduk, 1988).   
If teachers want to motivate and support learning for their students, then why do some 
teachers fail to develop close relationships while others succeed?  We suggest that part of the 
variability in these relationships can be attributed to the three goals that underlie social 
cognitions.  To illustrate how these goals might play out in the realm of teacher-child 
relationships, imagine a teacher who pays particular attention to getting to know his students at 
the beginning of every year.  He observes his students, identifies patterns of behavior, and 
develops predictions about different children.  
These “intuitive scientist” activities that the teacher engages in are essential first steps to 
developing relationships with his students.  As we stated earlier, accurate inferences and 
predictions should lead to more effective behaviors.  In general, the more accurate the teacher’s 
inferences are about various students, the better his relationships with them should be.  By 
clearly understanding their thoughts, feelings, and motivations, he can provide appropriate, 
individualized support that should contribute not only to improving their relationship, but also to 
increasing their achievement.   
Unfortunately, his goal to accurately perceive his students may be affected by his goal to 
be seen in a flattering light.  In school settings, teachers are pressured to ensure that students 
meet the standards of their parents, school, community, and government.  In this pressured 
environment, a teacher’s tendency to enhance the self may be heightened.  The teacher’s goal to 
enhance or maintain his self-concept is not necessarily bad for his relationships with students.  
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to discover the cause of the behavior in order to maintain his identity as a caring teacher (and to 
be perceived as caring by others).   
However, in a pressured educational climate, the need for efficiency may interact with 
the need to enhance his sense of self.  The teacher might instead speak briefly with the students 
to get the “problem children” under control.  Viewing a subset of his classroom as having 
dispositional defects involves little cognitive effort and avoids the suggestion that the disruptive 
behavior could be the result of his poor classroom management.  Due to a self-serving bias, the 
teacher might believe that he spent more time talking to these students than the average teacher 
would.  Thanks to naïve realism, he may perceive that any reasonable person would see how 
patient he had been.  Thus, if the students react with anything less than gratitude, the frustrations 
will begin to flow.  Each time that more problems emerge, it will confirm the teacher’s 
conclusion about this group of students.  As his stereotype of these students solidifies, the 
representativeness heuristic may play an important role in generalizing the teacher’s view of 
these students from “behavior problems” to “bad students”.  Expectations of these students’ 
academic work might decline and negative self-fulfilling prophecies may begin.  Meanwhile, the 
students’ perceptions of their teacher’s view of them may lead to lower self-esteem, decreased 
interest and effort in school, or more acting out.   
In this way, the interplay of the goals behind the teacher’s cognitions can powerfully 
impact his relationships with students which, in turn, may impact their achievement.  Ironically, 
high quality teacher-child relationships are even more important for “at-risk” and insecurely 
attached children, who may also require the most effort to understand (Ainsworth, 1989; Birch & 
Ladd, 1997; Burchinal, Peisner-Feinberg, Pianta, & Howes, 2002).   
The conceptualization put forth in this chapter offers a new lens through which teacher-
student relationship formation can be viewed.  The fundamental goal to perceive our social 
worlds accurately acts as a catalyst for these relationships.  However, the errors and ulterior 
goals of our social cognitions may impede the development of positive student-teacher 
relationships and, in turn, student achievement.   
Social perspective taking 
  Although we have focused largely on the mistakes that we make as social perceivers and 
the trouble that these three basic goals can get us into, we would like to conclude on a positive 
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impressive.  Assessing the mental worlds of others hundreds of times a day as we often do is a 
daunting task.  Yet, we tend to carry it off with surprising efficiency and accuracy.  Because this 
assessment task is so critical to navigating our social environments we might hope that schools 
would help facilitate students’ motivation and ability to accurately perceive their social 
environments while minimizing biases that emerge through the goals to think efficiently and to 
enhance the self.   
The work on social perspective taking (SPT) appears promising in this regard.  SPT 
consists of discerning the thoughts and feelings of others; it often requires that we determine how 
others perceive the social situation.  It encompasses both an ability that can result in accurate or 
inaccurate assessments as well as a propensity to engage this ability; that is, individuals may tend 
to take the perspective of others more or less frequently (Gehlbach, 2004a).  Research has shown 
SPT to be associated with altruistic behavior (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997), a reduction in 
stereotypic thinking and in-group bias (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and fostering cooperation 
between students (Johnson, 1975).   
Through these types of outcomes SPT should facilitate learning by improving teachers’ 
and students’ interpersonal relationships and their perceptions of the classroom climate.  
Teachers who are accurate and motivated perspective takers will be more likely to avoid the 
traps of naïve realism.  SPT may help students to balance their goal of maintaining their sense of 
self to think about the good of the larger community in addition.  Because SPT has also been 
associated with academic achievement (Gehlbach, 2004b), a more direct relationship to 
achievement is also possible.  Students who more accurately and/or more frequently try to 
understand how different classmates are thinking about and reacting to the material would seem 
poised to develop a richer understanding of the curriculum. 
Incorporating the teaching of this aptitude into different curricula could be tremendously 
valuable, particularly in social studies or literature classes where there is often a need to 
understand the thoughts and feelings of people from different cultures and historical periods.  
With the potential to impact achievement directly and indirectly, through interpersonal 
relationships, interventions that incorporate this aptitude into the curriculum seem doubly 
promising.  We also see great potential to impact student achievement by incorporating SPT into 
teacher preparation.  As research in this area continues, we hope that scholars will develop Motivated Thinkers        24 
 
 
increasingly effective, concrete strategies and approaches to teaching this important aptitude as a 
means to counteracting some of the biases in our social thinking. Motivated Thinkers        25 
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